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I. INTRODUCTION
A fundamental principle of bankruptcy law is that certain debts are
excluded from discharge' in a bankruptcy proceeding.2 Since the inception of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978,' certain educational debts are
nondischargeable in Chapter 7 bankruptcy.4 The policy underlying the
nondischargeability provision of § 523(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Code is
to keep educational loan and scholarship programs intact for future
students by prohibiting students who have received funds under these
programs from discharging their educational debts in bankruptcy.'
Recently, however, colleges and universities have faced the specter of
students who, if they play their cards right, may discharge tuition, room
and board, and other debts with impunity.' Controversy has flared regarding exactly what educational debts fall within the scope of
§ 523(a)(8), and courts have reached converse holdings on substantially
similar facts.7 Currently, whether or not an educational debt is dis-

1. A discharge releases the debtor from personal liability for pre-bankruptcy debts
and limits a creditor's recovery to the funds received in the bankruptcy process. See
1 DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET AL., BANKRUPTCY 12-13 (1992).
2. See Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 287 (1991). A primary purpose of the
Bankruptcy Code is "to relieve the honest debtor from the weight of oppressive indebtedness and permit him to start afresh." Williams v. United States Fidelity & Guar.
Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554-55 (1915). By enacting the nondischargeability provisions of 11
U.S.C. § 523(a), "Congress evidently concluded that the creditors' interest in recovering full payment of debts in these categories outweighed the debtors' interest in a
complete fresh start." Grogan, 498 U.S. at 287; see 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (1994) (setting
forth sixteen categories of nondischargeable debts).
3. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as
amended at 11 U.S.C. § 101-1330 (1994)).
4. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8); infra notes 14-15. A bankruptcy petition filed under
Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code is a "liquidation" form of bankruptcy in which a
trustee will collect all nonexempt property of the debtor, convert it to cash, and then
distribute the cash to the creditors. See 1 EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 9-10. In
contrast, a petition filed under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code is a "rehabilitation" form of bankruptcy in which the debtor retains her property and creditors are
paid from the debtor's post-petition earnings under a court-approved plan. See id. at
9, 13-14. This Comment will address educational debts in Chapter 7 bankruptcy only.
For a discussion of educational debts in Chapter 13 bankruptcy, see Seth J. Gerson,
Note, Separate Classification of Student Loans in Chapter 13, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 269
(1995).
5. See 124 CONG. REC. 1,791 (1978) (statement of Rep. Ertel).
6. See, e.g., Dakota Wesleyan Univ. v. Nelson (In re Nelson), 188 B.R. 32, 33-34
(Bankr. D.S.D. 1995) (allowing full discharge of $3057 tuition debt); Alibatya v. New
York Univ. (In re Alibatya), 178 B.R. 335, 340 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1995) (allowing full
discharge of $2550 housing debt); Seton Hall Univ. v. Van Ess (In re Van Ess), 186
B.R. 375, 376, 381 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1994) (allowing full discharge of $5774 tuition debt);
infra Part III.B.3 (discussing cases finding educational debts fully dischargeable).
7. Compare Stone v. Vanderbilt Univ. (In re Stone), 180 B.R. 499, 502 (Bankr.
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charged in Chapter 7 bankruptcy may depend solely upon in which
jurisdiction the university is fortunate, or unfortunate, enough to find
itself in.
This Comment surveys the case law interpreting the dischargeability
of educational debts under § 523(a)(8).8 Part II sets forth the cases that
construed the "educational loan" language of § 523(a)(8) prior to 1990.'
Part II.A. discusses the 1990 amendment to § 523(a)(8), which added
the terms "benefit overpayment" to the statute." Part III.B. then examines the cases that have interpreted the language of § 523(a)(8) subsequent to the 1990 amendment." Finally, Part IV proposes a strategy
whereby colleges and universities may navigate the Kafkaesque quagmire of judicial holdings under § 523(a)(8) and attempt to stem the flow
of student-debtors who deplete endowment resources by discharging
12
educational debts owing to the schools.
II.

DISCHARGEABILITY OF EDUCATIONAL DEBTS PRIOR TO

1990

Until the mid-1970s, no prohibition on discharging educational debts
existed, and a debtor could discharge student loans in bankruptcy. 3

M.D. Tenn. 1995) (holding tuition debt fully nondischargeable when student has
signed promissory note evidencing indebtedness), and Najafi v. Cabrini College (In re
Najafi), 154 B.R. 185, 191 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1993) (holding tuition debt partially
nondischargeable when student attended classes for a few weeks), with Nelson, 188
B.R. at 34 (holding tuition debt fully dischargeable even when student signed prornissory note evidencing indebtedness), and Van Ess, 186 B.R. at 380-81 (holding tuition
debt fully dischargeable when student attended classes for a few weeks).
8. This Comment addresses the issue of dischargeability exclusively with respect
to debts where the student is the sole debtor. The student, however, is not always
the sole debtor; often the student's parent or spouse will cosign or guarantee the
debt. See Peter B. Barlow, Nondischargeability of Educational Debts Under Section
523(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Code; Equitable Treatment of Cosigners and Guarantors?, 11 BANK. DEV. J. 481, 482 n.4 (1994/1995). Two distinct lines of cases regarding
the applicability of § 523(a)(8) to cosigners and guarantors have emerged. See id. at
482. One line of cases allows discharge for cosigners and guarantors of educational
loans, the other line of cases does not. See id. This Comment, however, will only
address the dischargeability of educational debts in Chapter 7 where the student is
the sole debtor.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 13-74.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 79-92.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 93-187.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 188-211.
13. See Lee v. Board of Higher Educ., 1 B.R. 781, 783 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Darrell Dun-

As part of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, however, Congress enacted § 523(a)(8), 4 denying debtors in Chapter 7 bankruptcy a discharge for any educational loan to a governmental unit or nonprofit
institution of higher education." Congress gradually broadened the
scope of § 523(a)(8), 6 and by 1990, § 523(a)(8) read as follows:
§ 523.
Exceptions to discharge.
(a) A discharge under section 727, 1141, 1228(b), or 1328(b) of this title does not
discharge an individual debtor from any debt-....
(8) for an educational loan made, insured, or guaranteed by a governmental unit,
or made under any program funded in whole or in part by a governmental unit or
a nonprofit institution... .

During the twelve years following the enactment of § 523(a)(8), courts
were frequently called upon to see whether certain debts were "educational loans" within the meaning of § 523(a)(8)."8 Although some loans,

ham & Ronald A. Buch, Educational Debts Under the Bankruptcy Code, 22 MEM. ST.
U. L. REV. 679, 680 (1992); Barlow, supra note 8, at 487-88.
14. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 101, 92 Stat. 2549, 2591
(codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (1994)). Although § 523(a)(8) did not
come into being until 1978, Congress actually enacted the first prohibition against the
discharge of student loans two years earlier as section 439A of the Higher Education
Act of 1965. See Education Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-482, § 127(a), 90
Stat. 2081, 2141 (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1087-3 (1976) (repealed 1978)). Section 317
of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 repealed section 439A. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 317, 92 Stat. 2549, 2678 (1978).
15. Although the original Senate bill, S. 2266, 95th Cong. (1977) (enacted), contained the nondischargeability provision of section 439A of the Higher Education Act
of 1965, the House bill, H.R. 8200, 95th Cong. (1977), did not prohibit discharge of
educational loans. See Thad Collins, Note, Forging Middle Ground: Revision of Student Loan Debts in Bankruptcy as an Impetus to Amend 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8), 75
IOWA L. REv. 733, 743 (1990). Ultimately, however, Congress adopted the Senate bill.
See id. For an exhaustive discussion of the legislative history to § 523(a)(8), see
Palmer v. Student Loan Fin. Corp. (In re Palmer), 153 B.R. 888, 892-94 (Bankr. D.S.D.
1993).

16. See Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-353, § 454, 98 Stat. 333, 375-76 (removing requirement that nonprofit institution
must be one "of higher education"); Act of Aug. 14, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-56, § 3, 93
Stat. 387 (including all federal, state, and college financial assistance programs funded
in whole or in part by a governmental unit or a nonprofit institution of higher education); see also Barlow, supra note 8, at 488 (setting forth legislative changes to
§ 523(a)(8) from 1978 to 1994).
17. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (1988), amended by Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L.
No. 101-647, tit. XXXVI, § 3621, 104 Stat. 4789, 4964-65.
18. See, e.g., United States Dep't of Health and Human Servs. v. Avila (In re
Avila), 53 B.R. 933, 937 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1985) (holding that an educational loan existed where a debtor received funds under a scholarship program); University of New
Hampshire v. Hill (In re Hill), 44 B.R. 645, 647 (Bankr. D. Mass 1984) (concluding
that a university's extension of credit qualified as a loan); Shipman v. Dep't of Mental
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such as Guaranteed Student Loans, 9 obviously fell within the ambit of
§ 523(a)(8)," ° it was unclear to what extent an extension of funds, such
as a scholarship award,2' living stipend,22 work study advance,23 or
credit extension" qualified as an educational loan for purposes of
nondischargeability under § 523(a)(8). The courts formulated two different tests for determining whether a debt constituted an educational loan
within the meaning of § 523(a)(8).25 The first test, the "educational purposes" test, looked to see whether the funds were for educational purposes. The second test,
however, looked to see whether the extension
27
of funds was a "loan."

Health (In re Shipman), 33 B.R. 80, 82 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1983) (holding that a "salary" in exchange for a promise to work for the Department of Mental Health upon

graduation was not an educational loan). But see 2 EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 1, at
395 (commenting that cases questioning what is and what is not an educational loan
"have not seen any significant action in the courts").
19. Guaranteed Student Loans were first prohibited from discharge in 1976 under
section 439A of the Higher Education Act of 1965. See Collins, supra note 15, at 743
n.92; supra note 14 (setting forth legislative history of section 439A). Congress renamed the Guaranteed Student Loan program the Robert T. Stafford Student Loan
Program in 1988. See Act of April 28, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-297, § 2601(a), 102 Stat.
330 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1071(c) (1994)). Stafford loans are made by
private and governmental lenders but guaranteed by the Department of Education. See
Gerson, supra note 4, at 279-80 n.78.
20. But see Ealy v. First Nat'l Bank (In re Ealy), 78 B.R. 897, 898 (Bankr. C.D. M.
1987) (holding a Guaranteed Student Loan was not an educational loan because the
creditor-assignor failed to establish whether the student used the proceeds for educational purposes).
21. See United States Dep't of Health and Human Servs. v. Avila (In re Avila), 53
B.R. 933, 934 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1985); infra text accompanying notes 47-57 (discussing
Avila).
22. See United States Dep't of Health and Human Servs. v. Vretis (In re Vretis), 56
B.R. 156, 156 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1985); infra text accompanying notes 35-39 (discussing Vretis).
23. See Shipman v. Department of Mental Health (In re Shipman), 33 B.R. 80, 81
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1983); infra text accompanying notes 30-34 (discussing Shipman).
24. See University of New Hampshire v. Hill (In re Hill), 44 B.R. 645, 646 (Bankr.
D. Mass. 1984); infra text accompanying notes 40-46 (discussing Hill).
25. Cf. Dunham & Buch, supra note 13, at 689-91 (suggesting that two approaches
existed under pre-1990 case law for determining whether a debt constituted an educational loan for purposes of § 523(a)(8) but citing a case where the debtor was the
cosigner, not the student).
26. See Vretis, 56 B.R. at 157; Shipman, 33 B.R. at 82.
27. See United States Dep't of Health and Human Servs. v. Avila (In re Avila), 53
B.R. 933, 936-37 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1985); Hill, 44 B.R. at 647.

A. EducationalPurposes Test
Under the educational purposes test, "the central issue in determining
dischargeability [under § 523(a)(8)] is whether the funds were for educational purposes, not whether the funds constituted a loan."' Two different approaches of evaluating whether or not the funds were for educational purposes existed:' the Shipman approach of whether the proceeds were used for educational purposes and the Vretis approach of
whether the funds were awarded for educational purposes.
The first approach, employed by the Bankruptcy Court for the Western
District of Missouri in Shipman v. Department of Mental Health (In re
Shipman)," looked to see if the debtor used the proceeds for educational purposes." In Shipman, the student entered into a contractual
relationship with the Missouri Department of Mental Health whereby the
department advanced the student a "salary" in exchange for her promise
to work for the Department of Mental Health upon graduation.' The
student resigned after six months and signed a note for $10,865.97 in lieu
of repayment by work but ultimately filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy.'
The court held that the financial obligation was not an educational loan
because the debtor spent the funds on rent and living expenses and "not
directly for an educational purpose."' Thus, under the Shipman ap-

28. Shipman, 33 B.R. at 82.
29. See Stevens Inst. of Tech. v. Joyner (In re Joyner), 171 B.R. 762, 764 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa- 1994).
30. Shipman, 33 B.R. at 80.
31. See id. at 82. The Shipman court traced the history of § 523(a)(8) back to the
nondischargeability provision under the Higher Education Act of 1965 and concluded
that the "direct link [of § 523(a)(8)] to the federal education statute is an excellent
indication" that the purpose of the funds controls. See id.; see also supra note 14
(setting forth the legislative history of section 439A). But see Joyner, 171 B.R. at 763
(stating that the Shipman "court's discussion focused on what constituted a 'loan' for
purposes of § 523(a)(8)").
32. See Shipman, 33 B.R. at 81.
33. See id.
34. See id. at 82; see also Ealy v. First Nat'l Bank (In re Ealy), 78 B.R. 897, 898
(Bankr. C.D. Ill.
1987) (holding the Guaranteed Student Loan was not an educational
loan because the creditor-assignor failed to establish whether the debtor used the
proceeds for educational purposes). The Shipman court, relying upon Commonwealth
of Virginia v. Ziglar (In re Ziglar), 19 B.R. 298 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1982), also predicated its holding on the facts that the note the student signed in lieu of repayment
by work was in return for money already advanced and that she did not return to
school after executing the note. See Shipman, 33 B.R. at 82. In Ziglar, a married
couple defaulted on seven Guaranteed Student Loans. See Ziglar, 19 B.R. at 299.
Although the Commonwealth obtained judgments and the couple executed a note in
release of the judgments, the couple later defaulted on the note. See id. The court
held that the note was not an educational loan but an agreement to release the two
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proach, an extension of funds to a student could never constitute a
nondischargeable educational loan where the student used those funds
for living expenses.
The second approach, however, looked to see if the funds were
awarded for educational purposes. In United States Department of
Health and Human Services v. Vretis (In re Vretis)," the student received financial assistance in the form of a living expense stipend and a
tuition and fee award for osteopathic school. 6 The student received the
funds under the Public Health and National Health Service Corps Scholarship Training Program in return for a promise to serve on active duty
in the National Health Service Corps for at least two years. When the
student ultimately defaulted on his service obligation, the Department of
Health and Human Services sought reimbursement.' Distinguishing
Shipman on the facts as involving a salary advance rather than a living
expense stipend, the Vretis court held that the financial assistance provided to the student was a nondischargeable educational loan under
§ 523(a)(8), notwithstanding the fact that the debtor may have used the
proceeds for rent and living expenses, because "the initial characteriza9
tion of the loan is what controls."

judgments because the couple did not receive money in exchange for the note and
they did not return to school. See id. at 300. But see Nicolay v. Georgia Higher
Educ. Assistance Corp., 370 S.E.2d 660, 660 (Ga. 1988) (holding that the consolidation
of seven promissory notes for student loans into one installment note which established a schedule for payment of the first seven notes was directly for educational
purposes).
35. 56 B.R. 156 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1985).
36. See id. at 156.
37. See id. Under the Public Health Service Scholarship Program, the Department
of Health and Human Services made grants to students who agreed to serve in the
commissioned Corps of the Public Health Service or as a civilian member of the
National Health Service Corps after graduation. See 42 U.S.C. § 234, repealed by Act
of Oct. 12, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-484, § 408(b)(1), 90 Stat. 2281.
38. See Vretis, 56 B.R. at 157. If a recipient failed to perform the required service
obligation, he was "liable for the payment of an amount equal to the cost of tuition
and other education expenses, and scholarship payments . . . plus interest at the
maximum legal prevailing rate." 42 U.S.C. § 234(f)(1), repealed by Act of Oct. 12,
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-484, § 408(b)(1), 90 Stat. 2281.
39. See Vretis, 56 B.R. at 157; cf. Stevens Inst. of Tech. v. Joyner (In re Joyner),
171 B.R. 762, 764 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1994) (holding, under post-1990 law, that "it
should not matter whether the money is used for tuition or other living expenses");
Barth v. Wisconsin Higher Educ. Corp. (In re Barth), 86 B.R. 146, 148 (Bankr. W.D.
Wis. 1988) (holding, with respect to a parent guarantor, a Guaranteed Student Loan

Thus, the courts developed two different approaches for evaluating
whether or not a debt was for educational purposes. The Shipman approach looked at the purpose for which the funds were used, while the
Vretis approach looked at the purpose for which the funds were awarded. In neither instance did the courts look to see whether the transaction
was a loan.
B. Loan Test
Other courts, however, eschewed the educational purposes test and
made a threshold inquiry into whether the funds constituted a loan in
determining dischargeability under § 523(a)(8). In University of New
Hampshirev. Hill (In re Hill),4 the university provided a student with
short term credit until the student received his loan proceeds.41 The student, however, was suspended for poor grades before he received the
loan proceeds, failed to pay his outstanding balance with the university,
and ultimately filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy.42 At trial, the university
argued that the extension of credit was a loan for purposes of
§ 523(a)(8).' The court agreed with the university and held the debt
nondischargeable under § 523(a)(8), saying that the distinction between
an extension of credit and a loan is "a distinction without a defense.""
The court relied upon the definition of a loan as "'a sum of money due to
a person"'45 and the debtor's acknowledgment that he owed the university tuition.46
One year later, in United States Department of Health and Human
Services v. Avila (In re Avila), 7 the Bankruptcy Court for the Western
District of New York provided a more comprehensive analysis of the
term "loan" under § 523(a)(8)." In Avila, the student received $22,007.34
under the Public Health Service Scholarship Program to finance his medi-

nondischargeable and
dent loan and spend
the scope of section
Servs. v. Avila (In re

saying that "[i]f a student were to take out a guaranteed stuit on a car or vacation, the student ... would still fall within
523(a)(8)"). But cf. United States Dep't of Health and Human
Avila), 53 B.R. 933, 936-37 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1985) (applying the

loan test rather than the educational purposes test on substantially the same facts);

infra
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

text accompanying notes 47-57 (discussing Avila).
44 B.R. 645 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1984).
See id. at 646.
See id.
See id. at 646-47.
See id. at 647.

45. Id. (quoting AMERICAN COLLEGE DICTIONARY (1970)).

46. See id.
47. 53 B.R. 933 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1985).
48. See id. at 936.
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cal education at the University of Puerto Rico.49 In return for the funds,
the student had to serve on active duty as a commissioned officer in the
Public Health Service or as a civilian member of the National Health Service Corp.' The student never served in either organization, and the Department of Health and Human Services sought reimbursement."
The court first noted that, although § 523(a)(8) prohibits the discharge
of an educational loan, Congress "did not elaborate on exactly what
constituted an educational loan."52 The court declined to apply the educational purposes test, without any reference to Shipman, saying "the
funds provided were for educational or educationally related purposes... what is encompassed by the term loan is determinative. " ' Next,
the court surveyed the definition of loan in other contexts. The court
started with the "classic" definition of a loan:
'In order to constitute a loan there must be a contract whereby, in substance one
party transfers to the other a sum of money which that other agrees to repay
absolutely, together with such additional sums as may be agreed upon for its use.
If such be the intent of the parties, the transaction will be considered a loan without regard to its form.'"

The court then looked at whether the transaction must assume a specific
form to constitute a loan and concluded that "'whether or not [a] transaction constitutes a loan, is to be determined from the surrounding facts
in the particular case."'" Finally, the court held that "[w]hether the
agreement was called a scholarship, award, grant or loan is immaterial.
The intent of both parties was to create an obligation which would re57
quire repayment. This was a loan."
49. See id. at 934.
50. See id.; supra note 37 (discussing the Public Health Service Scholarship Program).
51. See Avila, 53 B.R. at 934. At the time the debtor in Avila filed his Chapter 7
petition, the United States was entitled to recover $31,146.30. See id; supra note 38
(setting forth the United States' statutory right to reimbursement if the debtor fails to
perform the required service obligation).
52. See Avila, 53 B.R. at 936.
53. See id.; cf. United States Dep't of Health and Human Servs. v. Vretis (In re
Vretis), 56 B.R. 156, 157 (Bankr. M.D. Fla- 1985) (applying the educational purposes
test rather than the loan test on substantially the same facts); supra text accompanying notes 35-39 (discussing Vretis). Avila was decided two months prior to the Vretis
decision. See Vretis, 56 B.R. at 156; Avila, 53 B.R. at 933.
54. See Avila, 53 B.R. at 936-37.
55. Id. at 936 (quoting In re Grand Union Co., 219 F. 353, 356 (2d Cir. 1914)).
56. See id. (quoting Stolze v. Bank of Minn., 69 N.W. 813, 814 (Minn. 1897)).
57. Id. at 937; see also United States Dep't of Health and Human Servs. v. Smith,

Thus, for some courts, whether or not a debt was a loan determined
nondischargeability under § 523(a)(8). These courts looked at the substance of the transaction, rather than the labels used by the parties. Under the loan test, the threshold inquiry was not the purpose for which
the funds were used, but the intent of the schools and the student. If the
intent to lend or borrow funds existed, then the transaction was an educational loan for purposes of § 523(a)(8).
C. Andrews University v. Merchant
Although the courts interpreting the pre-1990 statutory language of
§ 523(a)(8) conceived two distinct tests, the educational purposes test
and the loan test, for ascertaining whether a debt constituted a
nondischargeable educational loan, one of the last cases decided under
the pre-1990 statutory language attempted to reconcile the two tests.8
In Andrews University v. Merchant (In re Merchant), a bank made a
loan to the student in connection with a student loan program, whereby
the university guaranteed the loan in the event of student default.' In
addition to the loan guaranty, the university also extended credit to the

807 F.2d 122, 127 (8th Cir. 1986) (relying upon Avila and holding that when a student received funds under the Physician Shortage Area Scholarship Program but never fulfilled the service obligation to practice in a physician shortage area, the funds
were an educational loan for purposes of § 523(a)(8)); United States v. Dillingham
(In re Dillingham), 104 B.R. 505, 509 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1989) (citing Avila and holding
that a scholarship award under the Public Health Service Scholarship Program "has
been determined to constitute an 'educational loan' within the meaning of
§ 523(a)(8)"); Rural Ky. Med. Scholarship Fund, Inc. v. Lipps (In re Lipps), 79 B.R.
67, 70 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1987) (citing Avila and holding that, when a student received a loan at a reduced interest rate under the Rural Kentucky Medical Scholarship program but never fulfilled the service obligation, the extra interest was an educational loan for purposes of § 523(a)(8)). But cf. United States Dep't of Health and
Human Servs. v. Brown (In re Brown), 59 B.R. 40, 41-43 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1986)
(following the Shipman rationale with respect to funds received under the Public
Health Service Scholarship Program without any citation to Avila and holding that
the government must show "what part of the stipend was used directly for educational purposes, i.e., books, supplies and equipment and what part was used for noneducational purposes, such as rent and living expenses").
58. See Andrews Univ. v. Merchant (In re Merchant), 958 F.2d 738 (6th Cir. 1992).
Although Merchant was decided in 1992, the court applied the pre-1990 language of
§ 523(a)(8) because the debtor filed her Chapter 7 petition before November 29,
1990. See id. at 739 n.1; see also Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647,
§ 3631, 104 Stat. 4789, 4966 (declaring effective date of amended § 523(a)(8) as 180
days after passage of the Act). The court did, however, find support for its holding
in the post-1990 language of § 523(a)(8), commenting that the new statutory language
"does strengthen the court's interpretation of Congress' [sic] intent." Merchant, 958
F.2d at 739 n.1.
59. See Merchant, 958 F.2d at 739.
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student for educational expenses in return for notes evidencing her indebtedness.' Thus, two distinct transactions existed, (1) the bank loan
guaranteed by the university, and (2) the credit extensions evidenced by
promissory notes payable to the university.
After graduation, however, the student defaulted on both the loan to
the bank and the promissory notes to the university.61 The university,
according to the terms of the guaranty agreement, reimbursed the bank
and brought suit against the student in satisfaction of both the guaranteed bank loan and the promissory notes. 2 The District Court for the
Western District of Michigan held that both the guaranteed bank loan
and the credit extensions were dischargeable under § 523(a)(8).'
The Sixth Circuit, however, reversed.' The first argument advanced
by the student was that the bank loan guaranteed by the university was
not an educational loan, under the second clause of § 523(a)(8), because
it was not "funded in whole or in part by a nonprofit institution."65 The
court rejected this argument and declined to adopt the district court's
reasoning that because the university did not purchase every bank loan it
guaranteed, just the loans in default, the university did not fund the bank
loans. 6 The circuit court, looking at the legislative history of
§ 523(a)(8), construed the statutory language of "funded in whole or in
part" more broadly, reasoning that the fact the bank had full recourse
against the university in the event of default "was crucial to [the debtor]
receiving money to fund a portion of her education."67
Next, the court considered the issue of whether the credit extensions
evidenced by promissory notes were educational loans within the meaning of § 523(a)(8).' The court first set forth the "classic" definition of

60. See id. at 739-41. The student signed the promissory notes in favor of the
university before she registered for class. See id. at 741.
61. See id. at 739.
62. See id.
63. See id. at 738-39.
64. See id. at 739.
65. See id. at 740.
66. See id.
67. See id.
68. See id. at 740-41. The court addressed the second prong of § 523(a)(8), that
the loan be "made under any program funded in whole or in part by a . . .nonprofit
institution," only with respect to the loan guaranty. See id. The court did not discuss
whether the second transaction, the credit extension, was made under a program
funded by the university. See id.

loan, 9 which was the same definition used by the Avila court." The
court then stated that, although the lower courts rejected the reasoning
of Hill,7 they found the Hill analysis persuasive.72 The Sixth Circuit
summarized Hill as finding that a credit extension is a loan for purposes
of § 523(a)(8) "when the following factors are present: (1) the student
was aware of the credit extension and acknowledges the money owed;
(2) the amount owed was liquidated; and (3) the extended credit was
defined as 'a sum of money due to a person."'73 The court then held
that, under Hill, because the student was aware of the credit extensions,
acknowledged the money owed as evidenced by the promissory note,
and received her education by agreeing to pay these sums of money after
graduation, the credit extensions were educational loans for purposes of
§ 523(a)(8).74
Following the Merchant reasoning, therefore, the extent to which an
extension of funds, such as a scholarship award, living stipend, work
study advance, or credit extension qualifies as an educational loan for
purposes of nondischargeability under § 523(a)(8) can be resolved by
answering one simple question: did the student acknowledge the obligation and did the student receive her education by agreeing to repay the
obligation? By examining whether the student acknowledged the obligation, the Merchant court focused on the student's intent to borrow funds,
thereby adopting the loan test.75 By examining whether the student received her education by agreeing to repay the obligation, the Merchant
court focused on the purpose for which the funds were used.' Thus,
the Merchant decision not only appears to reconcile the educational
purposes test with the loan test but also formulates a bright line rule for
educational debts under § 523(a)(8).

69. See id. at 741.
70. See United States Dep't of Health and Human Servs. v. Avila (In re Avila), 53
B.R. 933, 936 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1985); see supra note 55 and accompanying text (reviewing the Avila court's definition of loan).
71. University of New Hampshire v. Hill (In re Hill), 44 B.R. 645 (Bankr. D. Mass.
1984); see supra text accompanying notes 40-46 (discussing Hill).
72. See Merchant, 958 F.2d at 741.
73. Id. (quoting Hill).
74. See id. But cf. Virginia v. Ziglar (In re Ziglar), 19 B.R. 298, 300 (Bankr. E.D.
Va. 1982) (holding that a note executed to satisfy judgments on defaulted student
loans was not an educational loan for purposes of § 523(a)(8)); supra note 34 (discussing Ziglar).
75. See Merchant, 958 F.2d at 741.
76. The court also stated, in dicta, that the Hill analysis "is further supported by
In re Shipman . . . which held that the 'central issue in determining dischargeability
is whether the funds were for educational purposes, not whether the funds constituted a loan.'" Id. at 741 n.2 (citation omitted) (quoting Shipman v. Department of Mental Health (In re Shipman), 33 B.R. 80, 82 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1983)).
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III.

DISCHARGEABILITY OF EDUCATIONAL DEBTS SUBSEQUENT TO

1990

By the time the Sixth Circuit formulated its bright line rule in Merchant, Congress had already turned its attention to the issue of what
constituted an educational loan for purposes of § 523(a)(8).7 In 1990,
Congress expanded the scope of § 523(a)(8) to include "educational benefit overpayment."78 Unfortunately, Congress did not define the term
educational benefit overpayment and failed to provide any clarification
with respect to its intention in enacting the new language. In the face of
this Congressional silence, courts have turned their attention to interpreting the amended language of § 523(a)(8). The resulting morass of contradictory holdings annuls whatever small degree of certainty existed under
the earlier version of § 523(a)(8). Presently, whether or not an educational debt will be discharged in Chapter 7 bankruptcy may depend solely
upon what court hears the case.
A. The 1990 Amendment
In 1990, § 523(a)(8) was amended to read as follows:
§ 523.
Exceptions to discharge.
(a) A discharge under section 727, 1141, 1228(a), 1228(b), or 1328(b) of this
title does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt(8) for an educational benefit overpayment or loan made, insured, or guaranteed by a governmental unit, or made under any program funded in whole or in
part by a governmental unit or nonprofit institution, or for an obligation to repay
funds received as an educationalbenefit, scholarship or stipend ....

Very little legislative history exists, however, to shed light on Congress's
intent in enacting the new language. The educational benefit overpayment language first appeared in the Fair Debt Collection Procedures Act
of 1988.80 The Act, as Senate Bill 1961,81 was reported out of the Senate

77. See Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, tit. XXXVI, § 3621, 104
Stat. 4789, 4964-65 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (1994)).
78. See id.
79. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (1994) (emphasis added to indicate changes); see supra
text accompanying note 17 (setting forth pre-1990 statutory language).
80. 134 CONG. REC. 16,282 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1988). Although the original Federal
Debt Collection Act legislation was drafted by the Department of Justice in 1987, it is
unclear if this draft legislation included the educational benefit overpayment language.
See H.R. REP. No. 101-736, at 26 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6630, 6634.
81. S. 1961, 100th Cong. (1988).

Judiciary Committee without hearings or a written report.82 Thus, no
commentary concerning the original impetus for the language survives.
Although Senate Bill 1961 passed the Senate, no further action was
taken.' A similar act, with the same language regarding § 523(a)(8), was
proposed in the next Congress as Senate Bill 84,' but that too was reported out of the Judiciary Committee without hearings or a written
report.85 The House Committee on the Judiciary then picked up the legislation, under the aegis of House Bill 5640,86 and issued a report." In
that report, the Committee commented that the bill "expands [§]
523(a)(8) to apply to educational benefit overpayments, such as those resulting from a default on performance of an obligation on which an educational scholarship was conditioned."88 The Committee Report, however, provided no further explanation.
Ultimately, the House passed House Bill 5640,89 incorporated Senate
Bill 84 into House Bill 5640,"o and enacted the educational benefit overpayment language as part of the Federal Debt Collection Procedures Act
of 1990." The only further explanation proffered in support of the benefit overpayment language was a statement made on the House floor by
the Chairman of the House Committee on the Judiciary that the legislation "extends the Bankruptcy Code's nondischargeability of student loans
to debts which are similar in nature to student loans." 2
Thus, the plain language and legislative history of the 1990 amendment
resolved clearly the dischargeability of scholarship awards contingent
upon service obligations, putting an end to the Public Health Service
Scholarship litigation. The new statutory language did not succeed, how-

82. See H.R. REP. No. 101-736, at 26, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N., at 6634. The
"benefit overpayment" language first appears in the Act as it was reported out of
Committee. See 134 CONG. REC. S16,282 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1988).
83. See H.R. REP. No. 101-736, at 26, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N., at 6634.
84. S. 84, 101st Cong. (1989).
85. See H.R. REP. No. 101-736, at 26, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N., at 6634.
86. H.R. 5640, 101st Cong. (1990).
87. See H.R. REP. No. 101-736 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6630.
88. H.R. REP. No. 101-736, at 33-34, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N., at 6641-42.
Presumably, this was to put an end to the scholarship litigation in cases like United
States Department of Health and Human Services v. Avila (In re Avila), 53 B.R. 933
(Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1985), and United States Department of Health and Human Services v. Vretis (In re Vretis), 56 B.R. 156 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1985). See supra note 57
(setting forth cases considering the applicability of § 523(a)(8) to funds received under scholarship programs).
89. See 136 CONG. REC. 8241 (1990).
90. See id. at 8255.
91. Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, tit. XXXVI, § 3621, 104 Stat.
4789, 4964-65 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (1988)).
92. See 136 CONG. REC. 13,288 (1990) (statement of Rep. Jack Brooks).
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ever, in drawing a bright line as to which educational debts will be
nondischargeable as educational benefits overpayments. The coast was
clear for confusion.
B. Subsequent Case Law
The courts that have interpreted § 523(a)(8) since its amendment in
1990 are divided over whether a student's educational debt is an educational benefit overpayment or loan for purposes of § 523(a)(8). 3 Although less than a dozen reported cases address the post-1990 language,
three different approaches have emerged. Depending upon the jurisdiction, educational debts are (1) partially/fully nondischargeable,' (2) fully
nondischargeable when the student has executed a promissory note in
favor of the university," or (3) fully dischargeable.96
1. Partially/Fully Nondischargeable
a. Najafi v. Cabrini College
The first court to consider educational debts under the 1990 amendment was Najafi v. Cabrini College (In re Najafi).7 In Najafi, the student, after dropping out of Cabrini College, became a compulsive gain-

93. Compare Stone v. Vanderbilt Univ. (In re Stone), 180 B.R. 499, 500, 502
(Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1995) (holding tuition debt is an educational benefit overpayment
or loan when student has signed promissory note evidencing indebtedness), and
Najafi v. Cabrini College (In re Najafi), 154 B.R. 185, 191 (Bankr. E.D. Pa, 1993)
(holding tuition debt is an educational benefit overpayment or loan when student
attended classes for a few weeks), with Dakota Wesleyan Univ. v. Nelson (In re
Nelson), 188 B.R. 32, 34 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1995) (holding tuition debt is not an educational benefit overpayment or loan even when student signed promissory note evidencing indebtedness), and Seton Hall Univ. v. Van Ess (In re Van Ess), 186 B.R.
375, 380-81 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1994) (holding tuition debt is not an educational benefit
overpayment or loan when student attended classes for a few weeks).
94. See Stevens Inst. of Tech. v. Joyner (In re Joyner), 171 B.R. 762, 765 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 1994) (finding that the portion of debtor's loan attributable to room and
board was an "educational benefit"); Najafi, 154 B.R. at 191 (finding that debtor was
liable only to the extent of the benefit actually received); infra Part ILI.B.1 (discussing Najafi and Joyner).
95. See Stone, 180 B.R. at 502; infra Part llI.B.2 (discussing Stone).
96. See Nelson, 188 B.R. at 34; Alibatya v. New York Univ. (In re Alibatya), 178
B.R. 335, 340 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1995); Van Ess, 186 B.R. at 380; infra Part II.B.3.
97. 154 B.R. 185 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1993).

bier in Atlantic City and won over $100,000 playing blackjack. 8 Subsequent to his newly-found wealth, the student reapplied for admission at
Cabrini." The college allowed the student to register and attend classes
without making a tuition payment. 100 The student attended classes for
only two weeks but did not provide the college with an official or written notice of withdrawal.' At the end of the semester, the college
for the semester.0 2 The student
billed the student $4430, the full tuition
0 3
then filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy.
The Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania first
looked at some of the pre-1990 amendment cases that interpreted the
term educational loan under § 523(a)(8).' ° After reviewing four pre1990 amendment authorities,' the Najafi court held that Cabrini's advancement of credit to the student was an educational loan under the
previous version of § 523(a)(8), and therefore nondischargeable."° It is
unclear, however, whether the court relied upon the educational purposes test, the loan test, or the Merchant approach of combining the two
tests. On the one hand, by determining that the advancement of credit
constituted a loan, the court appears to have adopted the approaches of

98. See id. at 187-88.
99. See id. at 188.
100. See id. Officially, Cabrini prohibited students from registering and attending
class before they paid their tuition. See id. The student-debtor first testified that he
believed that Cabrini intended to waive his tuition obligations "due to his newly-acquired 'celebrity' status," but later admitted that the college had never made any
statements to him concerning such a waiver. See id. Although it is unclear from the
record, Cabrini appears to have taken the position that although the college was
willing to give the student some flexibility, it "expected the [d]ebtor to pay the tuition bill as soon as possible." See id.
101. See id.
102. See id.
103. See id. at 187.
104. See id. at 189. The Najafi court stated that "[flour cases have been located
which interpreted the term 'educational loan'.. . .. .. Id. But see supra Part II (discussing five cases that interpret the term educational loan).
105. The four cases that the Najafi court identified were Shipman v. Department
of Mental Health (In re Shipman), 33 B.R. 80 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1983), University of
New Hampshire v. Hill (In re Hill), 44 B.R. 645 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1984), In re
Ellenburg, 89 B.R. 258 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1988), and Andrews University v. Merchant
(In re Merchant), 958 F.2d 738 (6th Cir. 1992). See Najafi, 154 B.R. at 189. In
Ellenburg, the student attended classes under the mistaken impression that her mother was paying her tuition. See Ellenburg, 89 B.R. at 262. When the student learned
that her mother was not paying tuition, she withdrew. See id. The student testified
that she never borrowed any money and never signed any document agreeing to
repay money or interest. See id. For a discussion of the three other cases identified
by the Najafi court, see supra Part II.
106. See id. at 189-90.
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the Hill and Avila courts,"' focusing on whether the funds comprised a
loan rather than exploring the purpose for which the funds were
used." On the other hand, all of the extensions of credit were used to
satisfy the student's tuition debt so the court may have adopted the educational purposes test.' The court's sole rationale for concluding thatthe extension of credit was an educational loan under the pre-1990 version of § 523(a)(8) was that "[tihe weight of [the] authority support[ed]
the conclusion . . .
0
The court then went on to construe the 1990 amendment.'
The
court recognized that "the absence of commas in the phrase 'educational
benefit overpayment or loan' makes this phrase difficult to interpret."" 2
The court determined, however, that "the terms 'benefit,' 'overpayment,'
and 'loan' should be construed as a series of nouns, all modified by the
adjective 'educational.""' 3 Thus, the court reasoned, the receipt of an
educational benefit falls within the scope of § 523(a)(8) and is excepted
from discharge."'

107. But see Stevens Inst. of Tech. v. Joyner (In re Joyner), 171 B.R. 762, 764
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1994) (commenting that "[o]ur reasoning in Najofi . . . supports the
reasoning of the Vretis court").
108. See Najafi, 154 B.R. at 189-90.
109. See Joyner, 171 B.R. at 764.
110. See Najafi, 154 B.R. at 189-90. After reaching this conclusion, however, the
court said "[w]e agree with the [diebtor that it is difficult to characterize the instant
as 'an obligation to repay funds.' No funds were received by the {diebtor from either
Cabrini or any lending institution during the pertinent period." Id. at 190. It is impossible to ascertain why the court made this statement after specifically citing to the
Merchant decision. In Merchant, the Sixth Circuit expressly held that an extension of
credit by the university to the student was an obligation to repay funds even though
the student never received the funds physically. See Merchant, 958 F.2d at 741. The
Najafi court could have distinguished Merchant on whether the student was aware of
the credit extension and acknowledged the money owed. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. The Merchant debtor acknowledged the money owed, as evidenced
by the promissory note. See id. The Najafi debtor, however, testified that he believed
that Cabrini intended to waive his tuition obligation. See Najafi, 154 B.R. at 188. The
Najafi court, however, did not make this distinction. See id. at 189-90. Instead, the
court appeared to say that a credit extension is not an obligation to repay funds, a
finding which runs directly contrary to the Merchant opinion. See generally supra
text accompanying notes 58-76 (discussing the Merchant court's decision).
111. See Najafi, 154 B.R. at 190.
112. Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (1994)).
113. Id.
114. See id.

After determining that the receipt of an educational benefit is
nondischargeable, the court abruptly stated that the student received an
educational benefit from Cabrini."' Although, presumably, the court
predicated its finding on the two weeks of classes that the student attended, it did not specify what sort of educational benefit the student
received, relying instead upon a bare assertion of fact."6 The court did,
however, measure the value of the benefit according to the number of
weeks of classes that the student attended.1 1 7 The court found that the
debtor attended classes for one-seventh of the semester and limited the
nondischargeable debt to one-seventh of the tuition bill ($633) plus an
allowance for administrative actions ($750)."' Thus, $3680 of the
student's $4430 tuition debt was dischargeable." 9
b. Joyner v. Stevens Institute of Technology
Two years later, in Joyner v. Stevens Institute of Technology (In re
Joyner),2 ' the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania revisited the educational benefit overpayment or loan language of
§ 523(a)(8). Although the court purported to elucidate and reaffirm its
holding in Najafi,121 the Joyner decision succeeded only in further
clouding the § 523(a)(8) debate.

115. See id.
116. See id. The Najafi court did not address the requirement that the educational
benefit be made under a program funded in whole or in part by a nonprofit institution. See id at 189-91. But see Santa Fe Med. Servs. v. Segal (In re Segal), 57 F.3d
342, 348 (3rd Cir. 1995) (holding a loan made by employer to employee so that employee could pay off her student loan nondischargeable and rejecting Najafi's reasoning as inconsistent with § 523(a)(8) to the extent Najafi could be interpreted as not
requiring a program); Seton Hall Univ. v. Van Ess (In re Van Ess), 186 B.R. 375, 380
(Bankr. D.N.J. 1994) (finding that the Najafi debtor was not participating in a program funded by the college when he attended classes but failed to pay tuition); infra
notes 151-54 and accompanying text (setting forth the Van Ess court's discussion that
an educational benefit overpayment or loan must be made under a program funded
in whole or in part by a nonprofit institution).
117. See Najafi, 154 B.R. at 190.
118. See id. The college argued that the student should be held liable for the full
semester's tuition, pointing to its policy that a student must officially withdraw before
a refund would be honored. See id. at 191. The court rejected the college's argument
and refused to apply the policy because the college did not adhere to its own policies in accepting the student without payment of tuition. See id.; supra note 100 (discussing the college's policies).
119. See Najafi, 154 B.R. at 191.
120. 171 B.R. 762 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1994).
121. Judge David A. Scholl authored both the Najafi and the Joyner decisions. See
Joyner, 171 B.R. at 763; Najafi, 154 B.R. at 187. At the time of the Joyner decision,
Judge Scholl was Chief Bankruptcy Judge. See Joyner, 171 B.R. at 763.
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In Joyner, the court considered the dischargeability of "that portion of
the loan used to pay room and board," an issue it had expressly reserved
in an earlier order.122 Neither the order nor the opinion set forth the nature of the indebtedness, whether it was a loan made under the Stafford
loan program or an outstanding balance on the student's account. Arguably, however, the labeling of the debt as a loan without further discussion by the court suggests that the indebtedness was a bona fide loan
rather than an extension of credit or outstanding balance for unpaid
charges.
Inexplicably, however, the Joyner court did not analyze whether the
portion of the loan used to pay room and board was an educational
loan." Instead, the court looked only at whether the room and board
portion of the loan was nondischargeable under the second clause of
§ 523(a)(8) as "an obligation to repay funds received as an educational
benefit, scholarship or stipend."'" Citing the Najafi opinion, the court
held that the room and board portion of the loan was an educational
benefit within the meaning of § 523(a)(8) and thereby nondischarge-

able. 125

122. See Joyner, 171 B.R. at 763. In the earlier order, the court summarily declared
the "balance presently owed by the [diebtor" nondischargeable to the extent. that it
was attributable to tuition. See id. at 760-62.
123. It is unclear why the court failed to pursue this line of reasoning. The court
could have applied the loan test, as articulated in University of New Hampshire v.
Hill (In re Hil), 44 B.R. 645, 647 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1984), and held the loan
nondischargeable without any difficulty, especially if this was a bona fide loan. Likewise, the court could have applied either the Shipman or Vretis approach of the
educational purposes test. See supra Part H.A. (discussing Shipman and Vretis). Under the Shipman approach, the loan would have been dischargeable because the
funds were not used for educational expense but for living expenses. See Shipman v.
Department of Mental Health (In re Shipman), 33 B.R. 80, 82 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1983).
Under the Vretis approach, the loan would have been nondischargeable, even though
used for room and board, because, presumably, it was awarded for educational purposes. See United States Dep't of Health and Human Servs. v. Vretis (In re Vretis),
56 B.R. 156, 157 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1985). Thus, the court never needed to reach
whether the student received an educational benefit. Although the court does discuss
the Shipman and Vretis cases, it does so only to bolster its educational benefit finding. See Joyner, 171 B.R. at 763-65; infra text accompanying notes 126-28 (applying
the educational purposes test).
124. See Joyner, 171 B.R. at 763.
125. See id. The Najafi decision discussed only the educational benefit overpayment
or loan language of the first clause of § 523(a)(8). See Najafi, 154 B.R. at 190. The
Joyner court, however, was looking to see if the loan was nondischargeable under

Next, the court looked at the pre-1990 educational purposes test cases
to support its finding of an educational benefit. 26' The court concluded
that its earlier reasoning in Najafi supported the Vretis approach of the
educational purposes test: whether the funds were awarded for educational purposes.'27 The court reasoned:
the inquiry is upon whether the student receives an "educational benefit" from
II]f
a loan, it should not matter whether the money is used for tuition or other living
expenses. Both are part of the "educational benefit" sought by the student. Under
the guaranteed student loan program, for example, the loan proceeds may apparently be used by the student to pay for tuition, .room and board, books, student
fees, or any other expenses incidental to education. All of these expenses serve
the student's "educational benefit," and lenders and the government do not make
distinctions between the uses of proceeds when awarding such loans."

The court, therefore, held that the room and board portion of the loan
was an "obligation to repay funds received as an educational benefit"
because the receipt of the funds conferred an educational benefit on the
debtor."
Under Joyner, therefore, a credit extension for a room and board debt
is an educational benefit overpayment or loan for purposes of
§ 523(a)(8). Under Najafi, a credit extension for a tuition debt is an
educational benefit overpayment or loan for purposes of § 523(a)(8).
Thus, a college or university that is lucky enough to find itself in the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania may rest easy because educational debts
are either partially or fully nondischargeable in that jurisdiction.
2. Fully Nondischargeable When Student Has Executed a Promissory
Note: Stone v. Vanderbilt University
The Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Tennessee articulated
a second approach to educational debts under the 1990 amendment in
Stone v. Vanderbilt University (In re Stone). 3 ° In Stone, the student

the second clause of § 523(a)(8) as "an obligation to repay funds received as an educational benefit, scholarship or stipend." See Joyner, 171 B.R. at 763. Thus, the
Joyner court collapsed two distinct clauses of the statute into one educational benefit
rubric. Cf. Alibatya v. New York Univ. (In re Alibatya), 178 B.R. 335, 338 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 1995) (commenting that the defendant-university "blurs distinctions between
such excepted categories, blending them under one overarching rubric, namely, educational benefit"); infra note 169.
126. See Joyner, 171 B.R. at 763-65.
127. See id. at 764. But see supra text accompanying note 107 (commenting that
Najafi, by determining that the credit extension was a loan, may have adopted the
loan test).
128. Joyner, 171 B.R. at 764-65.
129. See id. at 765.
130. 180 B.R. 499 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1995).
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had an outstanding balance of $5145 with Vanderbilt, representing tuition, nurse malpractice insurance, and other administrative fees, when he
withdrew from school."' Vanderbilt refused to release a transcript unless the student "signed a promissory note for the balance on his account.""3 The student executed a note in favor of Vanderbilt, defaulted
on the note, and then filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy."
On summary judgment, the Stone court found the note nondischargeable. The court first set forth, in great detail, the Sixth Circuit's reasoning in Merchant.'35 Applying this reasoning, the court then held that
the promissory note for the outstanding balance was an educational loan
because the debtor did not deny the indebtedness, "the amount claimed
was liquidated, and the terms of the note prove[d] an 'amount due'
Vanderbilt. '"" The court, however, did not stop there; it also found that
"[a]n 'educational benefit' undoubtedly was conferred upon [the] debtor
at the expense of Vanderbilt."'37 In support of this finding, the court
noted that the debtor attended classes, participated as a student, and
was covered by nursing malpractice insurance.1" The court, therefore,

131. See id. at 500.
132. See id.
133. See id.
134. See id. at 502.
135. See id. at 501; see also Andrews Univ. v. Merchant (In re Merchant), 958 F.2d
738, 740-41 (6th Cir. 1992); supra text accompanying notes 58-74 (discussing Merchant).
136. See Stone, 180 B.R. at 501-02. The Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of
Tennessee, which falls within the Sixth Circuit, rendered the Stone decision. See 28
U.S.C. § 41 (1994) (stating that Tennessee falls within the Sixth Circuit). The Stone
court, however, did not state explicitly that it felt constrained by stare decisis to
follow Merchant. But cf. Tinmreck v. United States, 577 F.2d 372, 374 n.6 (6th Cir.
1978) (saying "[tihe district courts in this circuit are, of course, bound by pertinent
decisions of this Court").
137. Stone, 180 B.R. at 502.
138. See id. Although the court did cite Najafi in a footnote, the court's finding of
an educational benefit did not rely upon the Najafi reasoning. See id. at 501 n.5. But
see Dakota Wesleyan Univ. v. Nelson (In re Nelson), 188 B.R. 32, 34 (Bankr. D.S.D.
1995) (stating "Stone adopts the flawed and unsupportable construction of § 523(a)(8)
set out in Najafi"). It is unclear, however, exactly what rationale the court applied to
find an educational benefit apart from listing the debtor's activities at the school. See
Stone, 180 B.R. at 502. This was the court's sole explanation for why an educational
benefit was "undoubtedly conferred." See id.

held the note nondischargeable 39 because it was either a loan or an
educational benefit for purposes of § 523(a)(8). 4 '
Under Stone, therefore, a credit extension evidenced by a promissory
note is an educational benefit overpayment or loan for purposes of
§ 523(a)(8). Thus, a college or university that finds itself in the Middle
District of Tennessee may rest easy because educational debts are fully
nondischargeable in that jurisdiction when the student has executed a
promissory note in favor of the university.
3. Fully Dischargeable
a. Seton Hall University v. Van Ess
Yet a third approach to the statutory educational benefit overpayment
or loan language emerged in the bankruptcy courts of the Second Circuit.
In 1994, one year after the Najafi court's decision, the Bankruptcy Court
for the District of New Jersey considered the same issue on substantially
14
the same facts in Seton Hall University v. Van Ess (In re Van Ess). 1
In Van Ess, the student registered for the fall semester at the university's
law school, attended some classes, but did not pay tuition.142 The student subsequently filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy."
The university, relying on Merchant and Hill, argued that the student's
failure to pay tuition created an extension of credit to the student by the
university and that such an extension of credit was a nondischargeable
educational loan."M Alternatively, relying on Najafi, the university argued that the student's attendance at class and non-payment of tuition
resulted in an educational benefit under § 523(a)(8).'45

139. But see Virginia v. Ziglar (In re Ziglar), 19 B.R. 298, 300 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1982)

(holding that a note executed to satisfy judgments on defaulted student loans was
not an educational loan for purposes of § 523(a)(8)); supra note 34 (discussing
Ziglar). Under the Ziglar reasoning, the Stone court would have reached the opposite
result because the Stone debtor neither received any money in exchange for the note,
nor returned to school after the execution of the note. See Stone, 180 B.R. at 500;
Ziglar, 19 B.R. at 300.
140. See Stone, 180 B.R. at 502. Although the Stone court delivered its opinion subsequent to the decisions in Seton Hall University v. Van Ess (In re Van Ess), 186
B.R. 375 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1994), and Alibatya v. New York University (In re Alibatya),
178 B.R. 335 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1995), the court made no reference to this line of
cases. See infra Part III.B.3.a.-b. (discussing Van Ess and Alibatya).
141. 186 B.R. 375, 380 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1994).
142. See id. at 376.
143. See id.
144. See id. at 377.
145. See id.
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The court, however, rejected both of the university's arguments.14
The court began its discussion with a review of the legislative history of
§ 523(a)(8).'47 The court then looked at the "plain meaning" and the underlying policies of § 523(a)(8)" and concluded both weighed in favor
of discharge:
There is no overriding policy that warrants treating SHU differently from any other creditor. Indeed, given the ready availability of student grants and loans, one
might very well conclude that SHU is particularly well situated to avoid defaults
on tuition obligations. Students who need financial aid may avail themselves of
various government programs or university sponsored programs, and SHU need
not permit students to attend class unless the tuition is paid."'

Next, the court turned its attention to the university's entreatment that,
under the reasoning of Najafi, the debtor received an educational benefit." The Van Ess court, however, refused to adopt Najafi's "strained
reasoning," pointing out that the Najafi opinion ignored the requirement
that the educational benefit overpayment or loan must be made under a
program funded in whole or part by a "governmental unit or nonprofit
institution.''. The Van Ess court, looking at the facts of Najafi, did not
find that the Najafi debtor was "participating in a program funded by the
college" when he attended classes but failed to pay tuition.'52 Likewise,
the court found that the debtor in the case at bar did not participate in a
funded program when he attended law school classes without paying
tuition.'" Simply put, the court, with tongue in cheek, did not find that
either debtor participated in a "funded program which permitted attendance at school without payment of tuition." "

146. See id. at 378-81.
147. See id. at 378.
148. See id.; see also Barlow, supra note 8, at 489-93 (discussing the "plain meaning" approach to statutory interpretation of § 523(a)(8) in the context of cosigners
and guarantors).
149. Van Ess, 186 B.R. at 379. The Van Ess court did not mention Representative
Brooks's statement on the House floor that the amended language of § 523(a)(8) "extends the Bankruptcy Code's nondischargeability of student loans to debts which are
similar in nature to student loans." See 136 CONG. REc. 13,288 (1990); see also supra
text accompanying note 92 (discussing the statement of Representative Brooks).
150. See Van Ess, 186 B.R. at 379-80.
151. See id. at 380; supra note 116 (discussing the requirement that the educational
benefits or loan be made under a program).
152. See Van Ess, 186 B.R. at 380.
153. See id.
154. Id; see also Santa Fe Med. Servs., Inc. v. Segal (In re Segal), 57 F.3d 342, 348
(3rd Cir. 1995). In Segal, the employer, Santa Fe Medical Services, made a loan to an

The court also refused to construe the student's failure to pay as an
extension of credit, rejecting the university's Merchant and Hill argument
that a student's failure to pay tuition creates an extension of credit and
that such an extension of credit is a nondischargeable educational
loan. 5' The Van Ess court distinguished Merchant and Hill as "extensions of credit in connection with loan programs..". With respect to
Merchant, the court distinguished the credit extension as part of the
student loan program between the bank and the university.'57 With respect to Hill, the court distinguished the credit extension as a temporary
measure made in reliance on the debtor's application for a guaranteed
student loan and with the expectation that the debtor would pay the
credit as soon as he received the student loan proceeds."
Finally, the Van Ess court concluded its opinion by analogizing the
university's debt to a debt due to a family dentist.155 According to the
court, both creditors involuntarily extended credit to the debtor by virtue

employee so that the employee could pay off her National Health Scholarship obligation. See id. at 344; see also supra note 38 (discussing the National Health Scholarship Program). The Third Circuit held that the loan was not made under a program
funded in whole or in part by a nonprofit institution or governmental unit. See Segal,
57 F.3d at 347-50. The court found that Santa Fe, a nonprofit institution, did not
have a practice of making such loans to employees and did not have any procedures
in place, saying "[a]s far as we can tell, this was a unique, unprecedented arrangement created specifically to facilitate the acquisition of [the debtor] as a staff physician." See id. at 347.
155. See Van Ess, 186 B.R. at 380.
156. See id.
157. See id. The court, however, appears to have misread the facts of Merchant. In
Merchant, two distinct transactions existed: (1) the bank loan guaranteed by the university, and (2) the credit extensions evidenced by promissory notes payable to the
university. See Andrews Univ. v. Merchant (In re Merchant), 958 F.2d 738, 739 (6th
Cir. 1992); supra text accompanying notes 59-60 (discussing Merchant). Although the
Merchant court did find that the loan guaranty was a program funded in part by the
university, the Merchant court considered the credit extension independently of the
loan guaranty; in fact, the Merchant court explicitly failed to address whether the
credit extension was made under a program funded by the university. See Merchant,
958 F.2d at 740-41. Thus, no basis exists for concluding that the Merchant court considered the credit extension part of the loan program. In fact, the very structure of
the Merchant opinion, where the loan guaranty and the credit extension are discussed
in discrete sections, argues against such a conclusion. See id.
158. See Van Ess, 186 B.R. at 380. The Hill opinion, however, does not appear to
base its holding on the university's reliance on the guaranteed student loan or the
short term nature of the credit extension. See University of New Hampshire v. Hill
(In re Hill), 44 BR. 645, 647 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1984). Instead, the Hill opinion appears to rely solely upon the facts that the amount was certain and the debtor acknowledged that he owed the university tuition. See id.; supra text accompanying
notes 4046 (discussing Hill).
159. See Van Ess, 186 B.R. at 381.
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of the debtor's failure to pay, and the university should have no greater
remedy than other general service providers for nonpayment of a bill."
The court made very clear its stance on the dischargeability of educational debts, stating that "if Congress had intended the scope of § 523(a)(8)
to include the simple nonpayment of tuition or any and all extensions of
credit whether within or apart from an educational loan program, we
assume that it would have so stated." 6'
b. Alibatya v. New York University,
The Second Circuit's hard line approach towards the post-1990 language further solidified when the Eastern District of New York, in
Alibatya v. New York University (In re Alibatya),62 adopted the New
Jersey bankruptcy court's construction of educational benefit overpayment and loan." In Alibatya, a student entered into a one year housing
license agreement with NYU while attending graduate school.'6" Under
the license agreement, the fee was payable in three equal installments on
or before August 1, December 1, and April 1." In May 1989, three
months prior to the expiration of the one year period, the student termi-

160. See id.
161. Id. at 380. But see Peller v. Syracuse Univ. (In re Peller), 184 B.R. 663, 669
(Bankr. D.N.J. 1994) (stating that § 523(a)(8) "does not provide for the
nondischargeability of any type of higher institution's services, but is limited to the
extension of credit or a loan") (emphasis added); 136 CONG. REC. 13,288 (1990)
(statement of Representative Jack Brooks) (commenting that the 1990 amendment to
§ 523(a)(8) "extends the Bankruptcy Code's nondischargeability of student loans to
debts which are similar in nature to student loans"). Cf. Albemaz v. United States,
450 U.S. 333, 341 (1981) (cautioning against reading "much into nothing. Congress
cannot be expected to specifically address each issue of statutory construction which
may arise").
In Peller, decided three months after Van Ess, the New Jersey bankruptcy court
once again found an outstanding balance owed to a university fully dischargeable. See
Peller, 184 B.R. at 669. Although the debtors in Peller were the student's parents,
rather than the student, the court discussed the Hill, Merchant, and Najafi decisions
and did not cite to either line of cases under § 523(a)(8) dealing with parent cosigners. See id. at 667-69; see also Barlow, supra note 8 (discussing two distinct lines of

cases
162.
163.
164.
165.

regarding the applicability of § 523(a)(8) to cosigners and guarantors).
178 B.R. 335 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1995).
See id. at 340.
See id. at 336-37.
See id. at 337.

nated the license and vacated the apartment.'1 At the time the student
terminated the license, the student owed NYU $2550.50 under the terms
of the
license."' Subsequently, the student filed for Chapter 7 bankrupt8
cy.

16

The court began the opinion by attempting to clarify the university's
arguments for nondischargeability.'" The court concluded that the main
thrust of the university's argument was that the university's failure to
exercise its right to terminate the lease when the student did not make
the third rental installment constituted an extension of credit. 7 ' The
court, however, found no extension of credit and hence no loan because
no intent to make a loan, on the part of the university, and no intent to
borrow funds, on the part of the student, existed."'' The court determined that the parties intended to form a lessor/lessee relationship and
not a lender/borrower relationship.' 2 The court stated:
Defendant makes no showing or even plausible explanation as to how its forbearance under the express provisions of the housing license agreement, and not exercising its right to terminate, transmutes a rental obligation into a loan ....And
there is no indication that Plaintiff ever considered himself anything other than a
lessee of housing facilities.""

Thus, the court held that student room and board charges of an educational institution, standing alone, do not constitute a dischargeable debt
under § 523(a)(8).'74

166. See id.
167. See id.
168. See id. at 336.
169. See id. at 338. The court noted:
The underlying basis for Defendant's nondischargeability position is somewhat
enigmatic and therefore escapes precise analysis. At one point or another, either in papers filed or at oral argument, Defendant has sought to place
Plaintiffs student housing obligation within virtually every category of excepted educational debt identified in 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8). Remarkably, at the
same time, Defendant blurs distinctions between such excepted categories,
blending them under one overarching rubric, namely, educational benefit.
Id. at 338; see also Stevens Inst. of Tech. v. Joyner, (In re Joyner), 171 B.R. 763, 765
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1994) (collapsing two distinct clauses of § 523(a)(8) and holding that
loan was an "obligation to repay funds received as an educational benefit" because
the receipt of the funds conferred an "educational benefit" on the debtor); supra note
125.
170. See Alibatya, 178 B.R. at 338. The university refers to this as a "constructive
loan." See id.
171. See id. at 339.
172. See id.
173. Id.
174. See id. at 340.
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Under Alibatya, therefore, a credit extension for a room and board
debt is not an educational benefit overpayment or loan for purposes of
§ 523(a)(8). Likewise, under Van Ess, a credit extension for a tuition
debt is not an educational benefit overpayment or loan either.'75 Thus,
a college or university that finds itself in the bankruptcy courts of the
Second Circuit faces the distinct possibility that it will not recover from
a delinquent student.
c. Dakota Wesleyan University v. Nelson
The most recent case interpreting nondischargeability under
§ 523(a)(8) starts where the Second Circuit left off. Although the Middle
District of Tennessee had held that educational debts are fully
nondischargeable when the student has executed a promissory note to
the university evidencing such indebtedness,"' the South Dakota District Court reached a contrary conclusion on the same facts in Dakota
Wesleyan University v. Nelson (In re Nelson)."'7 In Nelson, the student
owed the university $3057 for tuition, room and board, course fees, and
books and supplies at the end of the 1990 fall semester."8 The student
enrolled for the 1991 spring semester and attended classes but did not
complete her 1990-91 financial aid application until the end of the semester.' The university, learning that no financial aid would be forthcoming because of the student's dilatory application, did not permit her to
take final exams and did not charge her for the spring semester.'" The
student signed a promissory note to the university but made only four
payments on the note before filing for Chapter 7 bankruptcy.'"' The
bankruptcy court declared the note dischargeable and the district court
affirmed.'8

175. See Van Ess, 186 B.R. 375, 380-81 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1994); supra text accompanying notes 141-61 (discussing Van Ess).
176. See Stone v. Vanderbilt Univ. (In re Stone), 180 B.R. 499, 502 (Bankr. M.D.
Tenn. 1995); supra Part fLI.B.2. (discussing Stone).
177. 188 B.R. 32, 34 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1995).
178. See id. at 33.
179. See id.
180. See id.
181. See id.
182. See id. at 34. The university appealed the bankruptcy court's unpublished opinion to the district court, which had jurisdiction to hear the appeal under 28 U.S.C.
§ 158(a) (1994). See Nelson, 188 B.R. at 33. The district court reviewed the bankruptcy court's factual findings and conclusions of law de novo. See id.; see also Wegner

The district court first held that no educational benefit overpayment or
loan existed because "the [ulniversity's choice to allow [the student] to
continue to attend classes without signing a note or making payment
cannot amount to a loan or an educational benefit overpayment.""
Next, the court determined that even if the student did receive an educational benefit, neither a nonprofit institution nor a governmental unit
funded the benefit by providing the student with funds."

v. Grunewaldt, 821 F.2d 1317, 1320 (8th Cir. 1987) (stating that "the district court
may review the bankruptcy court's legal conclusions de novo").
183. See Nelson, 188 B.R. at 33. The court cited four cases, Alibatya v. New York
University (In re Alibatya), 178 B.R. 335, 338-40 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1995), Peller v.
Syracuse University (In re Peller), 184 B.R. 663, 669 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1994), In re
Ellenburg, 89 B.R. 258, 262-263 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1988), and Department of Mental
Health v. Shipman (In re Shipman), 33 B.R. 80, 81 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1983), in support of this holding. See id. None of these cases, however, appear directly on point.
In Alibatya, the court determined that a straight-forward lessor/lessee relationship
existed. See Alibatya, 178 B.R. at 339; supra text accompanying notes 172-73 (discussing Alibatya). In Peller, the student's parents were the debtors while in Nelson
the debtor was the student herself. See Peller, 184 B.R. at 665; supra note 161 (discussing Peller). Unlike Ellenburg, the Nelson debtor was not attending classes under
the mistaken impression that her mother was paying her tuition. See Ellenburg, 89
B.R. at 262; supra note 105 (discussing Ellenburg). Also, the Ellenburg student withdrew once she learned that her tuition was not being payed and never signed any
document agreeing to repay money or interest. See Ellenburg, 89 B.R. at 262; supra
note 105 (discussing Ellenburg). Finally, it is unclear why the Nelson court cites
Shipman in support of its decision. Applying the educational purposes test of Shipman, the Nelson debtor's note would clearly be an educational loan for purposes of
§ 523(a)(8) because the extensions of credit were used for educational purposes like
tuition and course fees. See Nelson, 188 B.R. at 33. The Nelson court appears to have
overlooked the main tenet of Shipman: "the central issue in determining
dischargeability [under § 523(a)(8)] is whether the funds were for educational purposes, not whether the funds constituted a loan." Shipman, 33 B.R. at 82; see supra text
accompanying notes 30-34 (discussing Shipman).
Also, the Nelson court did not mention University of New Hampshire v. Hill
(In re Hill), 44 B.R. 645 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1984). See supra text accompanying notes
40-46 (discussing Hill). In Hill, the court held that an educational loan existed where
the university extended short term credit pending receipt of the student's loan proceeds. See Hill, 44 B.R. at 646-47. Arguably, the university in Nelson also supplied
short term credit until the student received her financial aid proceeds. The Nelson
court, however, did not make any attempt to distinguish Hill from the case at bar.
184. See Nelson, 188 B.R. at 33. It is unclear what the court meant by this statement. If the university extended credit to the student, then that extension of credit
was funded by the university. The proper inquiry is whether this credit extension was
a program within the meaning of § 523(a)(8). See supra text accompanying notes
151-54 (setting forth the Van Ess court's discussion that the educational benefit overpayment or loan must be made under a program funded in whole or in part by a
governmental unit or nonprofit institution).
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Finally, the court distinguished the case at bar from Andrews University v. Merchant (In re Merchant)," characterizing Merchant as a loan
made by a commercial lender and then guaranteed by the educational
institution." The court then held, in dictum, that the promissory note
itself was not a loan or educational benefit under § 523(a)(8), expressly
declining to follow Stone v. Vanderbilt University (In re Stone). 7
Under Nelson, therefore, a credit extension with a promissory note
acknowledging the obligation is not an educational benefit overpayment
or loan for purposes of § 523(a)(8). Thus, a college or university that
finds itself in the District of South Dakota confronts the very real possibility that it will not recover from a delinquent student because educational debts are fully dischargeable in that jurisdiction even when the
student has executed a promissory note in favor of the university evidencing her indebtedness.
IV. PROPOSAL

In light of the contradictory authorities, the course that universities
and colleges must follow to ensure that courts will not discharge educational debts in Chapter 7 bankruptcy is anything but clear. Reliance on

185. 958 F.2d 738 (6th Cir. 1992); see supra text accompanying notes 58-74 (discussing Merchant).
186. See Nelson, 188 B.R. at 34. The Nelson court, however, just like the Van Ess
court, misread the facts of Merchant. See supra note 157 (discussing the Van Ess
court's interpretation of Merchant). In Merchant, two distinct transactions existed: (1)
the bank loan guaranteed by the university, and (2) the credit extensions evidenced
by promissory notes payable to the university. See Merchant, 958 F.2d at 739; supra
text accompanying notes 59-60 (discussing Merchant). The Nelson court construed
Merchant as a case where the "debtor's obligation to the bank on the promissory
notes was funded, in part, by the university." Nelson, 188 B.R. at 34. The Merchant
promissory notes were in favor of the university, however, not the bank. See Merchant, 958 F.2d at 740-41. The Merchant promissory notes evidenced the credit extension by the university and were completely independent of the bank loan guaranty.
See id.
187. See Nelson, 188 B.R. at 34; cf. Virginia v. Ziglar (In re Ziglar), 19 B.R. 298, 300
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 1982) (holding that a note executed to satisfy judgments on defaulted student loans was not an educational loan for purposes of § 523(a)(8)); supra
note 34 (discussing Ziglar). The Nelson court stated that it would not follow Stone
because "Stone adopts the flawed and unsupportable construction of § 523(a)(8) set
out in Najafi." Nelson, 188 B.R. at 34. The Stone decision, however, did not adopt the
Najafi reasoning. See Stone v. Vanderbilt Univ. (In re Stone), 180 B.R. 499, 501
(Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1995); supra note 138 (discussing Stone).

the guidance set forth in prior decisions does not guarantee that the
college or university will succeed in having its debt declared nondischargeable under § 523(a)(8). For example, in Nelson,'" Dakota Wesleyan University appears to have followed, to no avail, the Van Ess
court's admonitions of requiring students to rely on government or
school sponsored financial aid programs and prohibiting students from
attending classes. 8 9 The Nelson student was late in filing her financial
aid application late and did not receive any financial aid."0 When the
University realized this, it prevented the student from taking final exams.' 9' The South Dakota bankruptcy court, however, still found the
debt dischargeable under the rationale of Van Ess.92
The Van Ess and Nelson decisions contemplate blind adherence to a
strict policy of not allowing delinquent students to attend classes. This
practice, however, may very well result in punishing an innocent student
for circumstances beyond her control and a public relations nightmare
for the school. For example, what course of action should a school pursue when a student's parent incurs large medical bills for an unexpected
surgery before the semester's tuition is paid, the parent's insurance company contests coverage for some of these expenses, and the parent cannot make the tuition payment until the matter is resolved? According to
the Nelson and Van Ess courts, the school should immediately prevent
the student from attending classes or run the risk of having the tuition
obligation discharged. The Van Ess and Nelson decisions, therefore,
force schools to choose between the Scylla of having an educational debt
owed by a delinquent student discharged in a Chapter 7 proceeding and
the Charybdis of inflexibility with respect to family calamities that create
temporary financial hardships.
In addition, many schools have monthly installment tuition payment
plans in order to accommodate middle-income families that do not have
the cash flow to make two large lump-sum payments.'93 How can
schools distinguish a trustworthy student (who will pay tuition over a
ten-month period) from a nontrustworthy student (who ultimately will
not pay and will file for bankruptcy)? Under the Van Ess and Nelson

188. See supra text accompanying notes 177-87 (discussing Nelson).
189. See Nelson, 188 B.R. at 33-34; Seton Hall Univ. v. Van Ess (In re Van Ess),
186 B.R. 375, 379 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1994); supra text accompanying note 149 (discussing
Van Ess).
190. See Nelson, 188 B.R. at 33.
191. See id.
192. See id. at 34.
193. See Toddi Gutner, Paying for the Kid's Sheepskin, Bus. WK., Nov. 11, 1996, at
134 (discussing prevalence of installment tuition plans for families "who can pay
tuition out of cash flow but don't have thousands of dollars tucked away").
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decisions, a school may have to choose between installment tuition payment plans or protecting itself from getting stuck with an unpaid tuition
bill. Discontinuing such tuition payment plans, however, may put an
education at the student's choice of schools beyond the reach of many
families who simply cannot pay $10,000 in September and January, but
who can afford to pay $1,500 every month.
Unfortunately, the courts that have considered the educational benefit
overpayment or loan language of § 523(a)(8) have failed to address such
difficult issues, leaving university counsel with little guidance. Colleges
and universities that are unlucky enough to find themselves in South
Dakota, New York, or New Jersey forums may not have much leeway to
argue their position. Most jurisdictions, however, have yet to consider
the issue. Thus, what strategy should schools follow to ensure that its
educational debts will not be discharged in Chapter 7 bankruptcy?
The first hurdle that every court must clear before addressing whether
the debt is an educational benefit overpayment under the post-1990 language of § 523(a)(8) is whether the debt is an educational loan. Nonetheless, courts interpreting § 523(a)(8) subsequent to the 1990 amendment" have disingenuously distinguished and, in effect, overruled the
prior case law of Andrews University v. Merchant (In re Merchant), 5
which held that a credit extension is a loan for purposes of § 523(a)(8).
Such a result, however, is wholly untenable. First, nothing in the legislative history indicates that Congress disapproved of the holding in University of New Hampshire v. Hill (In re Hill),96 the analytical precursor to Merchant.'97 Moreover, Representative Brooks's statement that
the amended § 523(a)(8) "extends the Bankruptcy Code's nondischargeability of student loans to debts which are similar in nature to student
loans" supports the conclusion that the 1990 amendment expanded, not
limited, the reach of § 523(a)(8).'98

194. See Nelson, 188 B.R. at 33; Van Ess, 186 B.R. at 380; infra Part III.B.3 (discussing Van Ess, Alibatya, and Nelson).
195. 958 F.2d 738, 741 (6th Cir. 1992); see supra text accompanying notes 58-74
(discussing Merchant).
196. 44 B.R. 645, 647 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1984); see supra text accompanying notes
40-46 (discussing Hill).
197. See supra notes 71-74 (discussing the Merchant court's adherence to Hill). The
Merchant decision, although rendered subsequent to the 1990 amendment, applied pre1990 law. See Merchant, 958 F.2d at 739 n.1; supra note 58 (stating that Merchant
was decided under pre-1990 statutory language).
198. See 136 CONG. REC. 13,288 (1990); see also Merchant, 958 F.2d at 739 n.1

Most importantly, however, the courts, in surreptitiously overruling the
Merchant holding that a credit extension is a loan for purposes of
§ 523(a)(8), have misread the facts of Merchant."9 In both Van Ess and
Nelson, the courts failed to recognize that, in Merchant, two distinct
transactions existed, (1) the bank loan guaranteed by the university, and
(2) the credit extensions evidenced by promissory notes payable to the
university.2" The proper reading of Merchant is that an extension of
credit by a university to a student will constitute a loan for purposes of
§ 523(a)(8) "when the following factors are present: (1) the student was
aware of the credit extension and acknowledges the money owed; (2) the
amount owed was liquidated; and ' (3)
the extended credit was defined as
'a sum of money due to a person. ' 2 °'
Thus, Merchant, if read correctly, is still good law and provides a
bright line rule that can be applied consistently both by courts and
schools. Under Merchant, a college or university that extends credit to a
student makes a loan for purposes of § 523(a)(8) when the student is
aware of the credit extensions, acknowledges the money owed as evidenced by promissory notes, and receives her education by agreeing to
pay these sums of money after graduation. Furthermore, those courts
that have adopted the Merchant holding are equally willing to find an
educational benefit.12 Thus, an extension of credit should be an educational benefit overpayment or loan under § 523(a)(8).
Even when a school successfully convinces a court that Merchant
remains good law, however, the dischargeability battle is only half won.
The key to avoiding dischargeable debts is the adoption and implementation of a program for extending credit. According to the language of
§ 523(a)(8), the educational benefit overpayment or loan must be made
under a "program funded in whole or in part by a governmental unit or
nonprofit institution."2"3 Although it is unclear how formal such a pro(commenting that the new statutory language "does strengthen the court's interpretation of Congress' [sic] intent").
199. See supra notes 157, 186 (discussing the treatment of Merchant). Confusion regarding the facts of Merchant runs rampant and is not limited to the courts. See
Patricia Somers & James M. Hollis, Student Loan Discharge Through Bankruptcy, 4
Am. BANKR. INST. L.REV. 457, 466 n.88 (1996) (characterizing the Merchant court as
"refusing to give debtor discharge where credit extension by university to student
was for purpose of acquiring loan").
200. See Merchant, 958 F.2d at 740-41; supra notes 157, 186 (discussing the treatment of Merchant).
201. See Merchant, 958 F.2d at 741 (quoting Hill, 44 B.R. at 647).
202. See Stone v. Vanderbilt Univ. (In re Stone), 180 BR. 499, 502 (Bankr. M.D.
Tenn. 1995); Stevens Inst. of Tech. v. Joyner (In re Joyner), 171 B.R. 762, 765
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1994); Najafi v. Cabrini College (In re Najafi), 154 B.R. 185, 191
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1993); supra Parts 11I.B.1-2 (discussing Stone, Joyner, and Najafi).
203. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (1994); supra text accompanying note 79 (discussing
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gram needs to be, it must be more than a post facto attempt to explain
why the school failed to collect monies from the student. As the Van Ess
court commented, it is difficult to believe that a university has a funded
program which permits attendance at school without payment of tuition." 4
Arguably, the Van Ess decision should not be a bar to establishing that
an extension of credit by the school to a student is a program funded by
the university. In Van Ess, the court distinguished the Merchant holding
that a credit extension evidenced by promissory notes is an educational
loan for purposes of § 523(a)(8), stating that the credit extension was
part of an established student loan program whereby the university guaranteed bank loans.2" 5 Once again, however, the Van Ess court misread
the facts of Merchant. 6 In Merchant, the Sixth Circuit considered the
credit extension independent of the loan guaranty and appears not to
have questioned that the credit extension was made under a program
funded by the university.2 Thus, under a correct reading of Merchant,
seeking a promissory note evidencing indebtedness from each student
who has not paid in full by the second week of class should qualify as a
program.
In addition, it is very important that once a school has a program for
extending credit in place, it follow the program scrupulously. In Najafi,
the school had an official policy of prohibiting students from registering
and attending classes before they paid tuition.0 8 Although the court declared a portion of the debt nondischargeable, the court rejected the
college's argument that the student be liable for the full semester's tuition because the college, by accepting the student without payment of
tuition, did not adhere to its own policies.0 9
Unfortunately, the pro-discharge stance of the Van Ess, Alibatya, and
Nelson decisions ensure that students will litigate, with great fervor, the

the 1990 amendment to § 523(a)(8)).
204. See Seton Hall Univ. v. Van Ess (In re Van Ess), 186 B.R. 375, 380 (Bankr.
D.N.J. 1994); supra notes 151-54 (discussing the Van Ess court's finding that the
debtor did not participate in a funded program).
205. See Van Ess, 186 B.R. at 380.
206. See supra note 157 (discussing the Van Ess interpretation of Merchant).
207. See Andrews Univ. v. Merchant (In re Merchant), 958 F.2d 738, 740-41 (6th Cir.
1992).
208. See Najafi v. Cabrini College (In re Najafi), 154 B.R. 185, 188 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1993).
209. See id. at 191.

dischargeability of educational debts in Chapter 7 bankruptcy. When the
school inevitably finds itself in court, however, it should avoid lobbying
for the adoption of the Pennsylvania bankruptcy court's approach in
Najafi and Joyner.10 Although the Najafi and Joyner decisions appear
to be the most sympathetic approaches to nondischargeability under
§ 523(a)(8) for a university or college, this luster is only superficial."' A
college or university's best bet for avoiding dischargeability of educational debts under § 523(a)(8) is to urge the court to adopt the Sixth
Circuit's holding in Merchant.
V. CONCLUSION

Recent decisions regarding the scope of § 523(a)(8) have spawned
uncertainty as to the dischargeability of educational debts in Chapter 7
bankruptcy. On substantially similar facts, courts have reached converse
holdings as to whether a credit extension by the school to the student
for tuition and room and board charges constitutes an educational benefit overpayment or loan for purposes of § 523(a)(8). Some courts allow
students to discharge these educational debts, some courts do not. Currently, whether or not an educational debt will be discharged in Chapter
7 bankruptcy may depend solely upon the jurisdictions in which universities and colleges are fortunate, or unfortunate, enough to find themselves.
Courts interpreting § 523(a)(8) since the 1990 amendment have, in
effect, overruled prior case law, which held that a credit extension is a
loan for purposes of § 523(a)(8). Colleges and universities, when faced
with the predicament of litigating the dischargeability of an outstanding
balance on a student's account, should petition the court for a correct
reading of the case law interpreting educational loans under § 523(a)(8).
Specifically, the school should contend that courts holding that a credit
extension is not an educational benefit overpayment or loan have misread the facts of the prior case law and that a credit extension is an
educational loan for purposes of § 523(a)(8) when the student is aware

210. Joyner v. Stevens Inst. of Tech. (In re Joyner), 171 B.R. 762 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1994); see supra notes 120-29 (discussing Joyner).
211. Analytically, both the Najafi and the Joyner opinions are inferior. The crux of
the court's analysis in Najafi is the absence of commas in the statutory language.
See Najafi, 154 B.R. at 190. Moreover, the Najafi court inexplicably refutes the reasoning of Merchant immediately after adopting it. See id. at 190; supra note 110 (discussing Najafi). Joyner confuses the two phrases of § 523(a)(8) and creates a hybrid
creature of an obligation to repay funds received as an educational benefit because
the receipt of the funds conferred an educational benefit on the student. See Joyner,
171 B.R. at 763-65; supra note 125 (discussing Joyner). Moreover, Merchant is an
appellate decision, in fact, the only appellate decision in this area.
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of the credit extension, acknowledges the money owed as evidenced by
promissory notes, and receives her education by agreeing to pay these
sums of money after graduation. Moreover, the school must be prepared
to show that it did not just permit class attendance without payment of
tuition, but that it has a funded program in place for extending credit.
Hopefully, this strategy will permit colleges and universities to stem the
flow of student-debtors who discharge educational debts in Chapter 7
bankruptcy, thereby protecting endowment resources for future generations of students.
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